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[2 - DOMESTIC RELATIONS-1958 TENNESSEE SURVEY
WILLIAM J. HARBISON*
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN

Three cases during the survey period dealt directly or indirectly
with the subject of adoptions.
In two cases which were discussed in the 1957 survey,' petitions
for the adoption of two children were denied because of domestic
difficulties in the home of the petitioning parents. The children were
ordered to be placed in custody of the State Welfare Department. The
foster mother, however, did not comply with this order promptly and
was adjudged in contempt by the trial court where her petitions had
been filed. The supreme court affirmed the contempt decree in a re2
cently reported case.
It also developed that after her unsuccessful attempts to adopt the
children, the petitioner moved to another county. There she filed new
petitions to adopt the same children, joining the Welfare Department
as a defendant. The Department filed a plea of res adjudicata, but
the trial court overruled this plea and declined to permit further defense by the Department. The supreme court sustained a petition
for certiorari by the Department, holding that it should be given full
opportunity to make any proper objection to the adoption.3 The court
held, however, that the plea of res adjudicata had been properly disallowed, since there had never been a trial on the merits under the first
two petitions, both of them having beeii dismissed without a hearing
as to whether the adoption would be for the best interest of the children.4 This holding must be regarded as somewhat liberal in favor of
the petitioner, inasmuch as she had been given ample opportunity
for a hearing in the earlier cases. 5 Since the welfare of the children
* Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; former Editor-in-Chief, Vanderbilt Law Review; member, Trabue, Sturdivant & Harbison, Nashville, Tennessee.

1. Clements v. Morgan, 296 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1956); In re Clements' Peti-

tion, 296 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. 1956), noted in Harbison, Domestic Relations-1957
Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REV.1082 (1957).
2, Clements v. Tennessee Welfare Dept., 309 S.W.2d 123 (Tenn. 1957).
3. Ibid.
4. Apparently there had been a separation and divorce between the husband
and wife who filed the original proceedings, and the wife had thereafter sought
to continue the proceedings alone. Both petitions had been denied, in one
case because of failure to perfect the adoption within the statutory period of
two years, Clements v. Morgan, 296 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1956), and in the
other case upon intervening petition of the Department but without an
actual trial. In re Clements' Petition, 296 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. 1956).
5. On March 13, 1956 she had been served notice to show cause within thirty
days why her petition should not be dismissed, and this notice had been disregarded. In re Clements' Petition, 296 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tenn. 1956).
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was involved, however, the result reached would seem to be justified.
Further, if there had been any substantial change in the circumstances
of the petitioner or the children since the earlier proceedings, the
petitioner should have been allowed a hearing.6
In the case of In re Matthews7 the supreme court held that actual
custody of a child is not necessary at the time a petition for adoption
is filed. The adoption statutes require the petition to state when custody was acquired by the petitioners, if they actually have custody
upon filing the petition, and require that before a final decree awarding adoption can be entered in the. ordinary case the child must have
resided with the petitioners for a specified time.8 But there is no
express requirement that petitioners must have ,custody before they
can file the initial petition, and indeed, certain sections of the adoption
statutes clearly seem to contemplate that the child need not be residing with petitioners at the date of filing the petition. 9 Accordingly
the supreme court in the present case held that the trial court erred
in dismissing the petition for adoption on the ground that petitioners
did not have custody when they filed it.
The petition in this case alleged that there had been certain proceedings concerning the child before a juvenile court, although the
exact nature of these proceedings was not stated. The natural parents
of the child were made defendants to the adoption proceeding. The
supreme court pointed out that if the juvenile court had already declared the child to be abandoned, then its natural parents were not
-necessary parties to the adoption case; 10 but if there had been no such
adjudication, then, with the natural parents before it, the court hearing the adoption petition could determine whether there had been an
abandonment."
In the third reported case, 2 however, the court of appeals correctly
held that neither the circuit nor the chancery court has jurisdiction
to declare a child abandoned and to terminate the rights of its natural
6. The rules of res adjudicata may apply in domestic relations cases as in
all others, but of course do not prevent a showing of a change in circumstances since a prior decree. Hicks v. Hicks, 26 Tenn. App. 641, 176 S.W.2d
,371 (M.S. 1943).
7. 310 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. 1957).
8. TENN. CODE AN. §§ 36-106, -118 to -i25 (1956).
9. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-103 (1956) (any person may be adopted

irrespective of his "place of residence"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-104 (1956)
(venue may be where petitioners reside or "where the child resides").
10. TENN. CODE ANw. § 36-110 (Supp. 1958). See Harbison Domestic Rezations-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REv. 1082, 1083 (1957).
11. Ibid. The statutes giving the juvenile courts authority to declare children abandoned and to terminate parental rights expressly state that circuit
and chancery courts may also make such adjudications in adoption cases.
TuEx. CODE ANN. § 37-243 (Supp. 1958). Since the adoption statutes also explicitly provide for such determinations, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-110 (Supp.
1958), there is no conflict in the jurisdiction of the courts.
12. St. Peter's Orphan Asylum Ass'n v. Riley, 311 S.W.2d 336 (Tenn. 1957).
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parents in the absence of adoption proceedings. The juvenile court
alone has such power except in adoption cases, by express statutory
provision, 13 and the court held that this express statute must prevail
over a general statute giving chancery courts jurisdiction over the
14
estates and persons of infants.
PERSONS IN

Loco

PARENTIS

In the case of Hollis v. Thomas15 the court of appeals dealt with the
concept of persons standing in loco parentis. The suit attacked certain
transfers of property from an elderly widow to her foster daughter
made during the last illness of the grantor. The relationship between
the two had been very close, and the chancellor held that a confidential relationship existed, creating a presumption of undue influence
which he found had not been dispelled by proof.
In reversing, the court of appeals pointed out that there is no such
presumption as to transfers between parent and child unless special
circumstances are proved.' 6 Accordingly if the parties occupied the
status of parent and child, the transfers would be valid, since no actual
misconduct or undue influence had been proved. Although there had
never been a formal adoption, .the court found that the grantor had
taken the defendant into her home when defendant was a young child
and had reared her. Both the grantor and her husband looked upon
the defendant as their daughter, and she, in turn, had cared for both
during their last years and had provided a home for them. Accordingly the court found that the grantor stood in loco parentis to the
defendant.
The court pointed out that whether one stands in loco parentis or
not is largely a matter of intention.'7 From the facts mentioned above,
the court concluded that decedent and her husband had voluntarily
assumed the duties of parents toward defendant and that this relationship had continued through the years.
The result seems equitable. Of course to create the relationship of
parent and child in a strict legal sense, with rights of inheritance, etc.,
there must be a formal adoption in accord with statutory requirements. 18 Nevertheless it is well settled that one can so assume obligations toward a child as to thereafter be estopped to deny the parentchild relationship, and as to be entitled to any benefits of the rela13. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-243-263 (Supp. 1958).
14. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-610 (1956).
15. 303 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
16. Halle v. Summerfield, 199 Tenn. 445, 287 S.W.2d 57 (1956).
17. See generally 39 AM. Jim., Parent and Child §§ 61-63 (1942); 67 C.J.S.,
Parentand Child § 71 (1950).
18. Couch v. Couch, 35 Tenn. App. 464, 248 S.W.2d 327 (E.S. 1951), noted
in Harbison, Domestic Relations-1953 Survey, 6 VAND. L. REV. 974, 977 (1953).
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tion.19 Accordingly it seems proper to give the foster child the benefit
of the special rule as to undue influence mentioned above.
DIVORCE AND ALIMONY

Jurisdiction: Domicile Requirement: In the case of Bernardi V.
Bernardi0 the husband who sought a divorce was an enlisted service
man. Before entering military service he had lived in Alabama, but
since 1954 he had been stationed in Tennessee. In 1955 he had married
in Tennessee, and his wife had resided in the state for more than a
year before the marriage. After the marriage the parties agreed to
reside permanently in the state, and the husband made inquiries
about a job after he should be discharged from the navy. In 1956
he registered to vote in the state. After the parties separated the wife
remained in Tennessee and was personally served with process in the
divorce action. The case was heard in April, 1956. The divorce proctor contended that the Tennessee courts had no jurisdiction over the
marriage because of lack of domicile in the state.
Both the trial court and the court of appeals held that there was
sufficient proof of domicile. In the last analysis the situs of one's permanent residence is a matter of intention, and the court pointed out
that the husband's repeated declarations of intent to remain in the
state, his marriage and registration made at least a prima facie case
in his favor. Further, in order to grant a divorce it is only necessary
that one of the parties to the marriage be domiciled in the state,21 and
-clearly the wife had made Tennessee her home even if the husband
were deemed not to have done so. Although she was a minor, her
marriage had emancipated her from her parents and enabled her to
establish a separate domicile.2 2 After separating from her husband
she had remained in the state, and under modern law a married
woman can establish a separate domicile from her husband.2 3 Therefore, since at least one of the parties was domiciled in Tennessee,
there was jurisdiction to grant the divorce.
A somewhat similar problem was dealt with in Greene v. Greene.24
There the petitioning husband had been a patient in a Tennessee
veteran's hospital almost continuously from 1950 until shortly before
the trial of his case in 1956. At the time of the hearing he was studying
19. Maguinay v. Saudek, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 145 (1857) (stepfather entitled
to sue for seduction of stepdaughter whom he had taken into his home and

treated as member of his family).
20. 302 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
21. Tyborowski v. Tyborowski, 28 Tenn. App. 583, 192 S.W.2d 231 (M.S.
1945).

22. Holman v. Holman, 35 Tenn. App. 273, 244 S.W.2d 618 (W.S. 1951).
23. Younger v. Gianotti, 176 Tenn. 139, 138 S.W.2d 448, 128 A.L.R. 1413

(1940).

24. 309 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
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a vocational course at an Illinois university, but he testified that he
intended to return to Tennessee to live and work. He had originally
been sent to the Tennessee hospital from another state at his own
request, and on the few occasions when he was able to be out of the
hospital he had tried to work in a Tennessee city. He had relatives
in the state with whom he stayed when he could be out of the hospital.
The petitioner was severely discredited at the trial insofar as the
merits of his divorce action were concerned. The trial court dismissed
his suit, holding that the petitioner was a resident of Illinois and that
the court lacked jurisdiction, and also holding that there was insufficient proof of the alleged grounds of divorce.
In reversing, the court of appeals held that the testimony of petitioner and his relatives sufficiently showed an intention to make Tennessee his permanent residence. Despite his misconduct in other
respects, which affected his credibility on the merits, the court found
no basis for discrediting his testimony as to domicile and no basis for
the trial court's holding that petitioner was domiciled in Illinois,
where he was temporarily attending classes. The case was remanded
to afford either party opportunity to offer more satisfactory evidence
on the merits.

25

Alimony and Homestead: In 1919 a chancery court awarded a divorce to a wife in an uncontested case. The husband was before the
court by personal service of process. He was the owner of a parcel of
real estate, and the chancellor awarded certain acreage of this to the
wife in fee simple as alimony. The parties had minor children, and
the chancellor ordered that the homestead interests in another portion
of the land be divested out of the husband and into the wife for life.
After her death it was ordered to pass to the children.
Commissioners were appointed to survey the various tracts. After
they filed their report, the chancellor entered a further order, confirming the report, and awarding the wife the alimony tract in fee.
This decree divested the husband of all right, title and interest in the
homestead tract and vested title in the wife for life with "the remainder interest" to the children "and their heirs and assigns forever." The remaining acreage of the husband was subjected to a lien
for costs and fees. Later the wife purchased this portion of the land
at a court sale.
25. The defendant wife was before the court only by publication. The
divorce proctor had resisted the action principally on jurisdictional grounds.
An amicus curiae had appeared at the request of the Legal Aid Society of
Milwaukee, where the wife resided, and had participated in the trial. He had
been awarded a fee by the chancellor, but this ruling was reversed on appeal

on the ground that his work could have been done by the divorce proctor.

In remanding the case to the trial court the court of appeals directed the
proctor or the amicus curiae to afford the wife an opportunity to testify if
she desired to contest the action.
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The wife died in 1954. By that time all of the children had attained
20
their majority. The husband thereupon filed the present action,
claiming title to all of the land. The trial court held that he had no
interest in any of the tracts.
The court of appeals affirmed. The court stated that clearly the
divorce court had power to award the wife a tract of the land as alimony. It found no error in the order of sale of the husband's separate
acreage to satisfy the lien for fees and costs. In any event the decrees
as to these tracts operated as muniments of title under which the wife
had held adversely for over thirty years, thereby perfecting her title
against any claims of the husband. 27
The homestead tract presented more difficulties. Relying upon a
recent decision of the supreme court,28 the court of appeals stated that
probably the chancellor should not have divested the entire title out
of the husband, but should only have given the wife a life interest and
the children the beneficial use during their minority. The first decree
in the cause could be construed to have no greater effect than this;
but in the later decree, confirming the commissioners' report, the
language used clearly divested all title out of the husband and gave the
children a remainder in fee. That a divorce court has power to enter
such a decree is well settled. 29 The court of appeals felt, however, that
the chancellor had entered this decree through a misinterpretation of
the divorce and homestead laws,30 probably under the mistaken view
that he was required to divest all title out of the husband. Nevertheless, although it may have been erroneously entered, the decree had
become final without exception or appeal. The husband, being before
the court by personal service, was accordingly held bound by the
decree.
HUSBAND AND WIFE

In the case of Kinkead v. State3' the eligibility of an officeholder
depended upon his being a "freeholder" of a city. In proceedings to
test his right to hold office, he insisted that he was qualified because his
26. Cobb v. Brown, 305 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
27. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-205 (1956).
28. Oliver v. Milford, 190 Tenn. 456, 230 S.W.2d 963 (1950).
29. Edwards v. Puckett, 196 Tenn. 560, 268 S.W.2d 582 (1954).
30. The divorce code, TENN. CODE AxN. § 36-824 (1956), provides that when
a divorce is awarded to the wife, the homestead interest in realty shall be
vested in her for life and after her death "shall pass" to the children. It was
long believed that the effect of this section was to give the children a remainder interest in fee. But in 1950 the supreme court indicated that the
section merely awards the wife a life interest and thereafter the beneficial
use goes to the children during their minority. After the interest of the
children ceases at majority, the property would normally revert to the
husbanfd or his heirs. See Oliver v. Milford, 190 Tenn. 456, 230 S.W.2d 963
(1950): and the interpretation thereof in the instant case, 305 S.W.2d at 247.
31. 303 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. 1957).
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wife owned a residence inside the city limits. Both he and his wife
lived in this home, and he had paid for extensive repairs thereon.
It appeared, however, that the defendant owned no realty inside the
city in his own name. His only marital interest in his wife's real
estate, of course, was that of a possible curtesy right. This interest
depends upon birth of children, ownership of realty by the wife at her
32
death, and survival by the husband. Even then it is only a life estate.
Consequently the supreme court held that ownership of this residence
by the wife would not make her husband a "freeholder" of the city.3
Further, the fact that he had paid for improvements upon her land
would not confer any interest in the realty upon him,34 even if he
could escape the ordinary presumption that the expenditures constituted a gift to the wife.35
In the case of Howell v. Davis36 a deed from a wife to her husband
was set aside on the ground that a confidential relationship existed
between them and that she had not had sufficient independent advice
about the transaction. Both parties were elderly and uneducated.
The husband attended to all of their business affairs. The couple had
inherited certain real estate as tenants by the entirety, but apparently
the husband did not understand that he had a right of survivorship.
Accordingly he had his attorney prepare a deed transferring all of the
wife's interest in the property to him. The proof showed that she did
not realize the effect of the document.
Since the enactment of the Emancipation Act in Tennessee, a wife
may own realty in her own name, and nothing in the act prohibits
conveyances between the spouses.3 7 By special statutory provisions,
one tenant by the entirety may convey his interest to the other.3 8 The
present case is not inconsistent with pre-existing law, but it simply
illustrates that a deed from a wife to her husband will always be carefully scrutinized by the courts to determine that she has not been de32. Day v. Burgess, 139 Tenn. 559, 202 S.W. 911 (1918); cf. Warmath v.
Smith, 198 Tenn. 257, 279 S.W.2d 257 (1955) (only interest of husband in
wife's estate where no children born is in her personal property, not in realty).
33. Even before the passage of the Married Women's Emancipation Acts,
the husband was not considered to have any ultimate ownership in his wife's
realty. He merely had the right to use and control it during coverture, and
after birth of children had an inchoate curtesy right. After death of the wife
the curtesy estate became "consummate." MADDEN, DomsTic RELATIONs, § 33

(1931). The emancipation statutes abolished his rights except for curtesy
consummate. In Tennessee even this right was at first held impaired by the
legislation, but it was expressly restored by statute. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-602
(1956); see Day v. Burgess, 139 Tenn. 559, 202 S.W. 911 (1918).
34. Holder v. Crump, 78 Tenn. 320 (1882).
35. Greenwood v. Maxey, 190 Tenn. 599, 231 S.W.2d 315 (1950).
36. 306 S.W.2d 9 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1957).
37. Howell v. Davis, 196 Tenn. 334, 268 S.W.2d 85 (1954) (dealing with
other aspects of the instant case); Runions v. Runions, 186 Tenn. 25, 207
S.W.2d 1016, 1 A.L.R.2d 242 (1948).

38. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 64-109 (1956).
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frauded or overreached. The burden of proof is usually upon the
husband or those claiming through him to prove that the transaction
was entered into by the wife freely and without pressure or misunder39
standing.
In the case of Nashville Milk Producers,Inc. v. Alston 4 a transfer
by the husband to his wife of a herd of dairy cattle was held to be
fraudulent as to creditors of the husband. There had been no change
of possession, there was proof that the husband was in embarrassed
circumstances when the transfer occurred, and neither spouse saw fit
to testify in defense of the transaction despite the charges of fraud.
In the absence of rebutting evidence, the court of appeals held that
the creditors had made out a sufficient case.
39. 26 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife §§ 268-273 (1940).

40. 307 S.W.2d 66 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).

